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This paper makes four general points. There are organized
community anti-crime activities going on across the country.
Neighborhood residents, acting together through community
organizations, have made a serious contribution to the decline
in violent crime nationally. If we invest in and support the work
of these citizens and their organizations, their activity can be-
come more widespread, more sustained and can have a larger
impact on violent crime. As an anti-crime strategy, this is the
most effective, democratic, and humane path available to Amer-
ica-the one most likely to make communities safer and friend-
lier places to live.
II. DECLINING CRIME
Violent crime reached its peak in the U.S. in 1993. That
year, according to the Bureau ofJustice Statistics, there were 4.2
million violent crimes in this country In 1994, there were
75,000 fewer.2 By 1996, there were nearly 930,000 fewer violent
crimes than in 1993.3 Although rape, robbery, assault, and
homicide have declined at different rates, they are all down.
. Director of the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS).
'Violent crime is measured by the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)
conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Data on murder is collected in
the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The information is available at the BJS web







When looked at as a group, violent crimes are at a twenty-three
year low, the lowest since the agency has been collecting data.5
This encouraging national trend does not mean that violent
crime is down everywhere nor that Americans are relaxed and
feeling confident in their ability to solve the problem of crime.
According to Roper organization polling:
crime still tops the list of concerns about the nation's welfare, and crime
worries are well above the levels of the 1980s or 1970s.... The share of
adults who name crime among their top two or three [concerns] rose
sharply in the early 1990s.... Between 1991 and 1995, the percentage
almost doubled, from 29 percent to a record high of 54 percent. Al-
though the current share is 5 percentage points lower than the peak,
crime still ranks much higher than other issues ....6
America's unease with the good news about crime is not
paranoia. The trend is fairly recent and there have been other
promising declines that have lasted a few years before the vio-
lence began increasing once again. The tentativeness of the
news about violent crime has stimulated at least two significant
discussions, partly captured in these Chicago Tribune headlines:
"Is the Crime Drop a Blip, For Real, or a Ticking Bomb?" and
"Violent Crime Takes a Tumble, Though Reasons are Murky.
7
One question raised here: is this decline part of a long term
trend, like the decrease in property crime, which has been evi-
dent since 1975, or just a temporary dip that will reverse itself?8
A second question: what is causing this decline? This causal is-
sue, not so much murky as multi-faceted, is related to the first.
If we can figure out what is responsible for the good news, we
can, perhaps, do more of what works and increase the likeli-
hood that the trend towards a less violent society is long term.
We can also apply our understanding of what is working to some
locations where the news is not so good.
5 <http://www.OJP.USDOJ.Gov/bjs/glance/4meastbl.txt>.
" Editors of Roper Reports, The Big Picture: Crime Fears, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, July
1997, at 35.
Steve Mills, Is the Crime Drop a Blip, for Real, or a Ticking Bomb, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Apr. 19, 1998, at P1; Steve Mills, Violent Crime Takes a Tumble, Though Reasons are
Murky, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 21, 1998, at N1.
" The property crime data is also available at the BJS web site. See BJS, supra note 1.
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III. WHY THE DECLINE?
There are a host of reasons suggested for the decline: low
unemployment, fewer young men in the crime-prone age
group, stable and less violent drug markets, fewer handguns on
the street, reduced alcohol and drug consumption, more peo-
ple serving longer prison sentences, smarter policing, commu-
nity policing, and community participation in anti-crime efforts.
Most of these explanations have policy implications that
beckon elected officials to invest tax dollars in particular strate-
gies. As Roper's findings indicate, though the public is not yet
convinced by the good news, the public is hungry for safer
communities and seems receptive to solutions. So it is proper
that there should be public debate about why crime is declining.
It is critical that we invest energy and tax dollars to achieve this
public good.
But it is also clear that data are subject to varying interpreta-
tions, causation is hard to identify with certainty and the debate
is complicated by a significant amount of individual and institu-
tional self-interest in one argument or another.9 In fact, the na-
tion is presently engaged in a fateful discussion about what is
driving this decline. In part, the outcome of this discussion will
help determine where resources go and what cities, neighbor-
hoods, and the criminal justice system will look like in the
twenty-first century.
Probably the most widespread explanations for the decline
at present are that smarter policing, tougher laws, longer sen-
tences, more cops, and a quadrupling of the prison population
are the major causes of violent crime's decline. Getting smart
and getting tough probably do make a contribution. After all,
getting guns off the street is smart. Even if they are kept at
home, this reduces the accessibility and decreases the likelihood
of impulse shootings, serious injuries, and homicides.
And getting tough has put more violent offenders in prison
and the more in prison at any time, the fewer there are in the
9 My own self-interest in this debate is tied to community organizing and commu-
nity building. I direct a coalition of community organizations, the Chicago Alliance
for Neighborhood Safety, that would benefit from investment that supported this
strategy as a serious crime and violence reduction policy.
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community committing crimes. If you keep people in prison
long enough, the argument goes, they grow out of the crime-
prone age range. In the jargon, they "age-out." Whatever the
effect of "incapacitation," of larger numbers of people in prison
for longer times, we hear about these solutions not only because
of their social scientific merit. We also hear about them because
taking credit for the decline in crime is a major component in
the strategies of powerful political, ideological, and law en-
forcement groups.
IV. ORDINARY PEOPLE
Though sometimes appended as an afterthought, discussion
about what ordinary people are contributing to this decline in
violence is rare. I argue that they are a major force for safer
communities. This suggestion runs into what appears, from a
community organizer's perspective, to be a dominant cultural
attitude, one that is dismissive of collective, grassroots efforts.
Organized neighborhood activities are invisible on televi-
sion's popular crime and police shows. Though there are some-
times helpful citizens in minor roles, for the most part non-
police are portrayed as criminals, reluctant witnesses, or power-
less victims in the story of America's criminal justice system.
These shows never present an organized community as part of
the solution. The few allusions to block watch or other neigh-
borhood crime prevention activities are either accompanied by
a sneer or depicted as a kind of vigilante effort.
Television programs do not capture the excitement of
neighbors figuring out, through democratic discussion, what to
do about a neighborhood crime problem. Missing from the na-
tion's visuals are community meetings that are punctuated, as
they are in reality, by laughter, anger, and the satisfaction of col-
lective insight. Television does not depict the pride and feeling
of empowerment shared by a group of residents who have taken
action and forced the police to pay attention or who have freed
a park from gang domination and made it once again accessible
to neighborhood people.
Ironically, in an era that can't say enough about the virtues
of shrinking government, on the topic of crime, officials and
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opinion makers are most comfortable with praising and spend-
ing on the criminal justice system. This does not reflect only the
power of lobbies and ideology-though they are influential-it
also reflects the belief among large numbers of government of-
ficials, criminal justice researchers, and media workers that or-
dinary people's efforts don't make a difference. Even worse,
organized volunteers are potentially threatening, so the less en-
couragement, the better. Organized volunteers have opinions.
They have policy preferences. They can mobilize and make
demands. Keeping them at a distance and portraying citizens,
as "eyes and ears," isolated, apathetic, and only moved by law
enforcement's prodding is within the comfort zone of those
who fashion our cultural images and provide us with informa-
tion and analysis.
The depiction of police, courts, and prisons, warts and all,
as the major, if not sole, guardians of public safety, goes largely
unchallenged. The community residents who do volunteer in
their neighborhoods have no powerful lobby to call attention to
the contribution they are making or provide them with a
mechanism for participating in the national discussion.
V. THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY RESIDENTS
But ordinary people do have an impact on the national
crime and violence statistics that we are currently celebrating
and debating. They have an impact directly and they have an
impact indirectly, through the sheer accumulation of private
individual decisions. For health and other reasons, for exam-
ple, people have reduced their drug and alcohol consumption.'0
Because substance abuse, especially in the case of alcohol, is
implicated in much violence, these individual decisions have an
impact on violent crime."
0 Robert Nash Parker & Randi S. Cartmill, Alcohol and Homicide in the United States:
1934-1995--or One Reason why U.S. Rates of Violence May be GoingDown, 88J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMNOLOGY 1369 (1998).
" According to Alcohol and Crime, a BJS analysis, Lawrence Greenfeld found that
among the 11.1 million victims of violence each year, one in four were certain that
the offender had been drinking before committing the crime. About one in 20 were
certain the offender had been using other drugs. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ALCOHOL AND CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DATA ON THE
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People also decide that, with jobs available, they will work in
a legal instead of an illegal sector of the economy, where they
are less likely to be a victim of violence, or a victimizer. Or, as
Richard Curtis' study of the Bushwick neighborhood in Brook-
lyn illustrates, young people, frightened by the activities of their
older brothers and neighbors, forced to retreat from public
spaces by drug dealing, violence, police harassment, and neigh-
borhood decay, reject the culture that they see on their streets
and choose other, less violence-prone life styles.'
Though they pay tens-of-billions of dollars each year to sup-
port the police, courts, and prisons, Americans have not dele-
gated all public safety responsibility to the criminal justice
system. In addition to private decisions by large numbers of in-
dividuals that have an indirect impact on crime and violence,
many people decide to have a direct impact, to work together
on shared problems. There are some case studies and some
survey results on this topic, but the magnitude and impact of
this organized activity is largely a missing part of the story of de-
creasing violence. 3
To tell the story and assert that the organized efforts of
neighborhood residents are a causal factor, an important one,
in the decline in violent crime, several questions need to be an-
swered. How massive is this phenomenon of organized grass-
roots effort? Is neighborhood-level activity really widespread
enough to make a difference, especially at the level of national
statistics? However large the number of volunteers, is there any
evidence that their activity is likely to reduce crime in communi-
ties?
Finally, if volunteerism is both massive enough and some
significant portion of it is effective, can participation be ex-
panded? Can what President Clinton, in his May, 1997, com-
PREVALENCE OF ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME 2-3 (1998). See also Parker & Cartmill,
supra note 10, at 1359.
12 Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime, Vio-
lence, Drugs, and Youth in the 1990s, 88J. GRiM. L. & CRINMNOLOGY 1233 (1998).
" Bibliographies of the literature on community crime prevention are available in:
ROBERT C. DAVIS & ARTHUR J. LURIGIO, FIGHTING BACK: NEIGHBORHOOD ANTIDRUG
STRATEGIES 133-43 (1996); Tim Hope, Community Crime Prevention, in BUILDINGA SAFER
SOCITY 21, 78-89 (Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington eds., 1995).
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mencement address at Pennsylvania State University called a
"citizen force," be expanded by the million volunteers he sug-
gests as a goal?1 4 Can its impact deliberately be intensified and
broadened so that it can contribute further to a decline in
criminal violence?
VI. THE MAGNITUDE OF VOLUNTEERISM
The Bureau ofJustice Statistics (BJS) has been conducting a
crime survey each year since 1973.15 One-hundred thousand
Americans, twelve years-of-age and older, are asked whether
they or anyone in their household were victims of crime in the
past year, the nature of the crime, whether they reported it to
the police, and if not, why not. With the exclusion of homicide
and commercial crime statistics, criminal justice professionals
consider this survey the best measure of the actual level of crime
or victimization in our country.
Beginning in 1992, in a tiny departure from its focus on
Americans' individual experience as victims, BJS added two
questions to the more than 160 about victimization and report-
ing. Interviewers asked people if they knew of neighborhood
watches or other anti-crime activities in their commuiities and,
if they did, did anyone in their household participate in these
activities.'
6
Over the five-year period, answers to the first question indi-
cate that, depending on the year, between thirty-nine and forty-
seven million Americans have known about these activities in
• 17
their neighborhoods. Answers to the second question indicate
that millions of Americans are actively working for safer com-
munities. Despite the absence of adequate resources or support
from the popular media, community resident participation in
'
4<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/12Rurn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us?1996/5/10/3.txt.l>.
'- In 1992, with a series of methodological changes, the survey title was changed
from the National Crime Survey (NCS) to the National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS).
16 The actual questions are: "Is there an organized neighborhood watch or citizens'
protection group for your area?" and "Do you, or does anyone in your household,
take part?"
1See BJS, supra note 1.
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neighborhood crime reduction activities, has ranged between
eighteen million and 19.1 million volunteers.' In 1996 (the
most recent year for which data are available), participation was
down about 4% from the previous year.19 Nevertheless, over
18.3 million people volunteered in block watches and other or-
ganized neighborhood safety activities.20 Roughly one in twelve
Americans, twelve years-of-age and over, participated in neigh-
borhood efforts aimed at improving public safety and the gen-
eral well-being of their neighbors.2'
To help put these numbers in perspective, there is a semi-
annual Gallup survey of philanthropic and volunteer activities in
America. It is commissioned by Independent Sector, a Wash-
ington based organization that studies and promotes volunteer
participation and philanthropic giving. In the latest figures
available, Gallup estimated that in 1995, ninety-three million
22people gave their time to various causes and organizations.
These volunteers represented over 40% of the respondents over
eighteen years old.23 They reported volunteering 4.2 hours per
week for a total of over twenty billion volunteer hours during
24the year.
Though the Gallup survey provides respondents with
choices as to the kind of volunteer activity they participate in,
community work in general and community anti-crime work
specifically are not among the possible responses.2 So there is
no exact match between these two sources of data on volunteer-
ism. Nevertheless, in the absence of a more precise source of
information, if we want an idea of the magnitude of volunteer
impact, we can cautiously infer that roughly one in five of Amer-
ica's volunteers invest some time in neighborhood safety issues.





VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON ET AL., INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING
INTHE UNITED STATES 3 (1996).
23 d.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 192-93.
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invested by volunteers in general, then Americans devote nearly
four billion hours to organized neighborhood safety activity
each year.
VII. WHO PARTICIPATES?
Who is putting in these hours? The level of participation
varies at different times among different groups. Participants
are racially and ethnically diverse. While people are at work all
over the country, community safety volunteers have tended to
be more active in cities with populations over 50,000.6 In 1996,
63% of the population lived in cities over 50,000,27 while 66% of
the volunteers lived in these cities;28 10.7% of the population
lived in cities over 500,000,2 while 11.4% of the volunteers lived
in these cities.30
In the same year, over nine million people from households
headed by men or women with less than a college education
were participating.31 But households with higher levels of edu-
cation tended to be represented at a greater rate than the less
educated. 2 Half of the participants came from households
headed by someone with a twelfth grade education or less, while
nearly 57% of the population came from such households.3
Similarly, though millions of less affluent people participated,
more affluent households were more likely to have a member
participating than were lower income households. 4 Half of the
volunteers came from households earning more than $50,000 a
year, while only 39% of the population lived in such house-
holds.35
Except for African-Americans, who were 14% of the partici-
pants, but only 12% of the population, all ethnic and racial




54 HODGKINSON ET AL, supra note 22, at 30.
"See BJS, supra note 1.
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groups participated at a level lower than their proportion of the
population. Whites, for instance, accounted for 84% of the
37population and 82% of the participants. Hispanics made up
9.5% and 7.8% and Asians and Pacific Islanders 3.3% and 2.9%
respectively.3 8 But the differences were small. And when one
considers the great likelihood of victimization among Blacks
and Hispanics, the less-educated, and those who live in low-
income neighborhoods, it is clear that there is significant under-
participation by these groups in relation to the need.
VIII. EFFECTIVENESS
But even growing numbers of volunteers in low-income and
at-risk neighborhoods will not reduce crime unless the activity
in which they are engaged is effective. Unfortunately, the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics survey reveals nothing more than the
bare demographics of this diverse movement. It tells us about
the households from which participants come, but the survey
provides no information about who the actual participants are
or about what they do to make their neighborhoods safer. It of-
fers no window into the decision-making process, the tactics,
strategy, or longevity of the activities in particular communities.
It is also silent about how the anti-crime activities of these volun-
teers relate to other community efforts in which they may be in-
volved. We do, however, have some idea of what these activities
are from direct experience, case studies, evaluations, and media
39
coverage.
We know that neighborhood safety volunteers serve in tradi-
tional roles as "eyes and ears" of the police by organizing citizen
patrols and working to restore business strips that are threaten-
3I6 d.
37 Id.
Id. Hispanics participated above their proportion of the population in the
$30,000-$40,000 income range.
"' BJS needs to add a series of questions on participation to its surveys so that re-
searchers and practitioners can get a better picture of who in the household is actu-
ally participating and how long they have been doing so. There need to be questions
that allow us to understand what they are doing and whether they are working with
and getting cooperation from the police.
1462 [Vol. 88
VOL UNTEERISM
ing to area residents. 40 They agitate for after-school and recrea-
tion programs. 4' They problem solve, targeting drug houses and
other problem buildings to force landlords to come up to
code.42 They march to dramatize their concerns. They take on
gangs.43 They fill courtrooms as "watchers."44 They agitate for
the rehabilitation, boarding-up, or tearing down of abandoned
buildings that are often dangerous eyesores in their neighbor-
hoods.45 They hold public officials accountable for some level of
community maintenance and insist that police treat the neigh-
borhood's residents respectfully. 46 They work to reduce liquor
store concentration and the loitering it attracts. 7 They conduct
positive loitering in open drug markets to disrupt them."'
Early findings from the Harvard School of Public Health's
ambitious ten year study, the "Project on Human Development
in Chicago Neighborhoods" (PHDCN), suggest that these and
other community efforts not directly focused on crime, do mat-
ter.49 Conducted in 343 "'neighborhood clusters"' of about
8,000 people, nearly 8,800 people were interviewed.0 The re-
searchers found that "social cohesion among neighbors com-
bined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the public
good, is linked to reduced violence."'
4 WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN HARTNETr, COMMUNIT'POLICING: CHICAGO STiL 173
(1997).
4, Id. at 177.
42 See Warren Friedman, The Community Role in Community Policing, in THE
CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISE 267 (Dennis P. Rosen-
baum, ed. 1994).
4 SKoGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 40, at 180.
" WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, YEAR
THREE, 82 (1996).
45 Id.
16 SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 40, at 123.
17 ANN MAXWELL & DAVID IMMffERGLUCEI, LIQUORLINING: LIQUOR STORE
CONCENTRATION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN LOWER INCOME COOK COUNTY
NEIGHBORHOODS 1 (1997); COMMUNITY ALLIANCE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY, TALES
FROM THE BEAT: THE COMMUNITY/POLICE PARTNERSHIP IN AMTION 5 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter CANS].
48 SKOGAN & HARTNET, supra note 44 at 53; CANS, supra note 47, at 15.
49RobertJ. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime A Multilevel Study of Col-





When people take responsibility for behavior in the neigh-
borhood, even communities with "concentrated disadvantage"
develop what the authors characterize as "collective efficacy,"
the "informal mechanisms by which residents themselves
achieve public order. 5 2 Among similarly disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods, there are some with higher levels of collective effi-
cacy. This is because people were more likely to intervene, for
instance, if a fight breaks out in front of their home, if they saw
children spray painting, or if the city threatened to close the fire
station closest to their home. Communities where individuals
or groups are likely to intervene in these and other ways have a
greater likelihood of being safer, less violent places to live. The
authors found that neighborhoods with high levels of collective
efficacy had, in fact, a 40% "reduction in the expected homicide
rate."55
If we could increase collective efficacy and achieve that kind
of reduction in poor, high crime communities around the
country, we would truly be in for a long decline in violent crime.
But we need to be clear. Saying that, all other things being
equal, the homicide rate was 40% lower than expected is not
the same as saying we can intervene in low efficacy neighbor-
hoods and bring their level of violence down the same amount.
Part of the reason that these neighborhoods were cohesive and
thus had conditions necessary for the effective expression of col-
lective efficacy was that they also had a high level of residential
stability.54 People had time, the reasoning goes, to get to know
and trust each other, and this knowledge and trust provide the
basis for individual and group interventions on behalf of the
community's well-being. 5
The hypothesis that residential stability is related to inter-
vention and thus to collective efficacy is supported by the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics survey. Homeowners and long-time
"2 "Concentrated disadvantage" consisted mainly of the presence of high levels of
poverty, public assistance, unemployment, female headed households and density of
children. Id. at 919.
II Id. at 922.




residents were more likely to participate in community safety ac-
tivities than were renters or newcomers. 5 Eighty-two percent of
those participants were from households that owned homes,
considerably more than the 69% of the population who owned
their own homes.
Beyond the contribution of residential stability, the authors
report that "collective efficacy was significantly. t. and positively
related to friendship and kinship ties (r=0.49), organizational
participation (r=0.45) and neighborhood services (r--0.21). "58
Nevertheless, when they controlled for these related neighbor-
hood characteristics, they found that "by far the largest predic-
tor of the violent crime rate was collective efficacy. '5 9
According to the authors, "collective efficacy thus retained
discriminant validity when compared to theoretically relevant,
competing social processes. "Moreover," they continue, "these
results suggested that dense personal ties, organizations, and lo-
cal services by themselves are not sufficient; reductions in vio-
lence appear to be more directly attributable to informal social
control and cohesion among residents. ' 6°
Put differently, a community can have many people who
know each other, but friendship and family networks can be
passive and rarely confront threats to the public good. A com-
munity can also have many organizations that are inert and in-
ward gazing, that rarely intervene for the neighborhood's well-
being. Based on their experience, community organizers would
assert that, given an issue or a shared need, collective efficacy
(they would not use the term) will be generated if there is a cul-
ture and tradition open to activism in these neighborhood net-
works and if there are leaders or organizers who act as catalysts
Community organizers would acknowledge that organizing in more transient
neighborhoods and encouraging residents to take leadership is a challenge. But they
would add that it is often hard to separate residential transience as a barrier to cohe-
sion from separate barriers created by the transience of resources for organizing in
these communities and the strings attached to the resources available.
57 See BJS, supra note 1. This pattern, however, was different for Hispanics who, in
their first three years tended to participate at a rate higher than their proportion of
the population.





and move others to intervene. Action for the public good by in-
formal or formal groups, the reasoning goes, takes initiators-
people who start the activity, urge others on, set an example.
When this exercise of will results in collective action, the person
or persons who have initiated the action have exercised leader-
ship. Key to generating collective efficacy from personal net-
works or community-based organizations are volunteer leaders
and community organizers who are willing to stimulate action
on behalf of the public good.
IX. CALLING ON PEOPLE TO INTERVENE AND COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATIONS
The evaluation of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy
(CAPS), Chicago's version of community policing, supports the
PHDCN finding that the presence of organizations is positively
related to collective efficacy. The evaluation is the most thor-
ough and sustained study of any city's attempt to implement
community policing. Four annual reports have thus far been
produced. The evaluation tracks the launching of an ambitious
and high risk strategy to transform most of the department and
to integrate the delivery of other city services with the delivery of
police service.
Through a series of citywide surveys, interviews with officers
and community residents, and observations of meetings and
training, the study documents and analyzes many of the suc-
cesses and failures in implementation within the department. It
also probes the attitudes, involvement, and training of the
community.
The philosophy that underlay much of CAPS encouraged
community activism. Producing safety, the message went, re-
quired a partnership, a problem-solving partnership. Neighbors
needed to work with neighbors, with the police, government,
and other institutions. They needed to be organized, active,
and informed. In a brief public partnership between the ad-
ministration of Mayor Richard M. Daley, the Chicago Police
Department, and the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety
(CANS), the message of participation, partnership and problem
solving was repeated frequently in the media, in the depart-
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ment's communications with its officers, through the curricu-
lum used to train police and in the training and outreach to
residents.
Philosophy and communication are not sufficient, however,
to explain the high level of energy invested by residents. An
important factor was the timing of Chicago's community polic-
ing. Violent crime was .rising and homicide was breaking rec-
ords.61 As participants in the campaign would testify, in the
neighborhoods, where the mayhem was occurring and in at-risk
neighborhoods that saw their future in the nearby high crime
communities, there was a desperate feeling that something had
to be done. As meeting after meeting made clear, this concern
about crime corresponded to a deep dissatisfaction among resi-
dents with how they were being treated by the police. In their
cars and out of touch, to residents, police seemed uncaring, un-
responsive, and disrespectful of community anti-crime efforts.
Rising crime and dissatisfaction with police service were
coupled with the presence of a citywide organization offering an
alternative that spoke to people's concerns. CANS was willing to
give leadership and to engage people in volunteer work both for
the safety of their communities and for a different, more re-
sponsive and accountable kind of police service.
62
For over two years, campaign participants said publicly to
the police superintendent, city council members, and the
mayor: we want to be policed differently; we want to work with
the police; we want to take responsibility for our neighbor-
hoods' safety; we want community policing.5 When the mayor
finally said yes, these volunteers felt some ownership. 4 They
had brought this new policing to their fellow Chicagoans and
6, Homicides had been rising since 1988, when 660 people were murdered. It
peaked in 1992. Nine-hundred and forty people were murdered that year. Index
crimes rose steadily from 1987 to 1991, from 281,030 to 323,909. See CH-CAGo POLICE
DEPT. BIENNIAL REPoRT: 1993 & 1994, at 11, 13 (1995).
62 For a more complete account of this campaign, see Warren Friedman, Grassroots
and Persistence The Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug.
1996, at 8. The issue is entitled Communities. Mobilizing Against Crime, Making Partner-
ships Won*63 Id. at 9.
" Id. at 8.
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their own communities, and they were determined to make it a
65
success.
Once its commitment to try community policing was in
place, city officials made a series of smart moves. They commis-
sioned a thorough management study from a team led by for-
mer head of the National Institute of Justice, James "Chip"
Stewart of Boos, Allen & Hamilton. Following many of the re-
port's recommendations, the City began to decentralize the de-
partment to make it possible for officers to be more responsive
to the community."" It assigned stable patrol teams to each of
the department's 279 police beats (areas with an average popu-
lation of 10,000 residents). It established regular meetings in
the neighborhoods where residents could count on meeting
with the patrol officers assigned to their beat. And the officers
were charged to work with the community. Initially, police de-
partment leadership and the mayor were unequivocal and very
public in their support for community partnership. And they
were willing to invest in training and mobilizing community
residents.
Called the Joint Community-Police Training Project (JCPT),
the training and outreach organizing project was an often tense
but creative effort by the police department, the city, and CANS.
Its purpose was to reach out to people and train them for their
role in solving neighborhood problems. Residents participated
because they were invited by twenty-five outreach organizers and
local organizations to come to an orientation conducted by six-
teen teams of community and police trainers. Using adult
learning techniques, the teams introduced Chicago's version of
. Id. at 11.
City officials have been inconsistent in creating the conditions for partnership.
They have failed to make the decentralizing meaningful by altering dispatch policy to
free officer time to work with the community on crime and disorder problems and
they have failed to establish a promotion process that evaluated officers on their
community policing performance.
67 In the first three months of the prototype stage, the Department, under internal
pressure, began to back down from its plan to free patrol officers who served on the
beat teams from a significant portion of 911 calls so they would have more time to
work with residents. Once this happened, the department began expecting too much
from the beat meetings.
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community policing and a problem solving method residents
could use with the police to make their neighborhoods safer.
At the end of the two-hour orientation, the trainers offered
short-term technical assistance to community volunteers who
wanted to work on real problems in their neighborhood.
Nearly 12,000 Chicagoans were trained before the mayor can-
celed the program.6 The evaluation of JCPT during 1995-96,
the height of the CAPS experiment, documents the dramatic
contribution outreach, training, technical assistance, and or-
ganizations can make in community anti-crime and anti-
disorder efforts.
Participants who attended training were surveyed at the
training and then were re-contacted four months later and in-
terviewed about the nature of their involvement since the train-
ing. These volunteers were divided into three categories
according to organizational affiliation: those with no affiliations,
those with one to three affiliations, and those affiliated with four
or more community-based organizations.
According to Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett, the
lead evaluators of Chicago's community policing program, by
far the largest number of participants fell into the middle cate-
gory: 66% had one to three affiliations; 19% had no affiliations;
and 15% had four or more.69 In terms of volunteers' willingness
to contribute to neighborhood safety, to actually work on a drug
market or a bad landlord, the researchers found:
* Participants with no community organization affiliation got
involved in problem solving 48% of the time.
The Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS) contracted with the City
to conduct the training in cooperation with the police department. CANS, a repre-
sentative from the Mayor's office, and the department developed the curriculum co-
operatively and all orientations were conducted by a police officer and a community
trainer employed by CANS. When CANS, an advocacy and watchdog group that led
the campaign for community policing, released Young People and the Police, a study it
had been working for 18 months before the contract, the mayor moved to cancel the
contract. He failed at his first attempt, but ultimately terminated the contract and
made the outreach a function of his office. A much reduced community training unit
was placed in the police academy.
'9 THE CHIcAGo COMMUNITY POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, COMMUNITY
POLICING IN CmcAGo, YEARTHREE 55 (1996) [hereinafter CCPEC].
19981 1469
WARREN FRIEDMAN
* Participants with one to three community organization af-
filiations got involved in problem solving 63% of the time
* Participants with four or more community organization af-
filiations got involved in problem solving 80% of the time.70
Researchers found that people who participated in commu-
nity-based organizations contributed most to the effort. This
finding reinforces and deepens the PHDCN conclusion that or-
ganization is positively related to collective efficacy. Where
there are community-based organizations committed to inter-
vention, the evidence shows that they play a critical role in sus-
taining and stimulating activity on behalf of public well being.
X. WHAT DID THESE VOLUNTEERS Do?
What did these mostly community organization members,
these residents disproportionately from high crime neighbor-
hoods, do? For one thing, 37% of them talked with their
neighbors more frequently about community problems than
they had before. 7' They invited others to participate and passed
on to them what they had learned: 63% of them tried to teach
neighbors what they had learned at the training (the median
was five other residents); 74% of them invited neighbors to
other trainings and meetings.72
But they did more than talk. As a crime reduction strategy,
problem solving requires active intervention. And the attendees
responded to the invitations to participate and the offers of
support from JCPT, CANS, the CPD, and the city. They worked
at solving problems. They got together (60% attended one or
more beat meetings, 40% attended one or more other crime re-
lated meetings) and intervened for the public good: 7
3
70 id.
71 Id. at 52.
72 id.
71 Id. at 53. It is clear from these figures that at least 25% participated in these ac-
tivities. Most likely it wks not only the people who met with business people who ral-
lied and milled in drug markets. I did not have access to figures that would clarify
what percent participated in any activity; what percent participated in two, three, etc.,
but it seems clear that over 25% did participate.
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0 14% of them participated in positive loitering, milling,
prayer meetings, and lemonade stands in drug markets
* 13% participated in rallies or demonstrations
* 25% met with local business people to express concerns
about crime or disorder problems.
Participants attempted to solve 63% of the problems they
identified.7 4 These problems included drug dealing (21%); so-
cial disorder, including, vandalism, public drinking, and loiter-
ing (19%); "conventional crime," including theft, rape, and
homicide (18%); and gang problems, including violence, graf-
fiti, and recruitment (17%).75 Participants succeeded, partly or
entirely, in solving 26% of the problems. 6
It is clear from participants' willingness to reach out to
neighbors, to talk to them about the community, and to teach
others what they had learned, that networking was stimulated.
It is clear from residents' willingness to join together to tackle
often intimidating crime and disorder problems and to face
their fears and actual threats of retaliation, that -the process
stimulated an outpouring of "collectively efficacious" behavior.
XI. VOLUNTEERING
It is important to remember that there are a host of motives
for volunteering. Being safe is one reason, but people also give
time in order to be of service to others, to belong and feel use-
ful, to learn and grow, and to be part of a respected commu-
nity.77 Most of us would like to live in safe, friendly, organized
communities that are dense with family and friendship networks
and where intervention on behalf of the public good is habitual.
But people's desires, motives and perceived benefits are not
sufficient to explain their participation. People give time be-
cause they are invited. Independent Sector's Gallup survey
found that "over half of all volunteers reported they were asked
by a friend; about one in three were asked by someone at their
7' CCPEC, supra note 69, at 55.
75 Id. at 29-30.
76 Id. at 57.
HODGKINSON ETAL, supra note 22 at 112.
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church or synagogue; and nearly one out of five were asked by a
family member or relative."78 It is critical to develop in commu-
nities the capacity to invite residents to join the effort to reduce
crime and make their neighborhoods safer. It is also important
to figure out how to keep residents inviting each other as crime
declines so that their activity maintains the decrease and re-
sponds promptly if crime begins to rise again. To build and
support a volunteer movement that reduces violent crime over
the long-term, we need to take into account the complicated
reasons people volunteer, figure out how to stimulate recruit-
ment (systemic invitation) in high crime communities and ask
the organizer's question of how to keep people involved.
As a public safety strategy, there is much to recommend
mobilizing some of the more than twenty million people identi-
fied in the BJS survey who knew of their neighbors' efforts and
did not participate. Ifjust 10% of them could be moved to join
the effort, America would gain about two million community
safety volunteers, twice the number President Clinton hoped for
in his Penn State speech.
XII. THE BIGGER PICTURE
Critical as it is, we should not romanticize or overstate the
impact of local solutions. Despite the potential short and long-
term effect dramatized by the PHDCN findings, there is a persis-
tent difficulty with isolated grassroots activity. As the authors of
the study indicate, the "image of local residents working collec-
tively to solve their own problems is not the whole picture."
''
There are powerful forces beyond the neighborhood that can-
not be addressed by community mobilization or local
empowerment. "The paradox of community crime prevention,"
Tim Hope points out in his review of the literature on neigh-
borhood anti-crime efforts, "stems from the problem of trying to
build community institutions that control crime in the face of
powerlessness to withstand the pressures toward crime in the
78 Id. at 110.
79 Sampson et al., supra note 49, at 923.
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community, whose source [s] ... derive from the wider social
structure."0
A long term solution, one capable of driving down the
number of violent crimes over a two-and-a-half decade period in
a way that is comparable to the decline in property crime, un-
doubtedly requires attention to these larger issues also. But it is
hard to imagine sustained attention being paid on the national
level to the big problems affecting ordinary people at the local
level, without first paying attention to and organizing communi-
ties that stand to benefit from these efforts.
XIII. NEXT STEPS
How do we shove the pendulum towards community build-
ing and a version of community policing in which residents have
a strong partnership role? How do we make this widespread
volunteer activity even more widespread and more effective in
its efforts to build a more democratic, safer, less violent nation?
It will be difficult, as tens-of-thousands of volunteers and profes-
sional organizers can testify.
There are a large number of people who have worked at
building and maintaining volunteer organizations around the
nation. Among the 1.4 million not-for-profits in this country,
there are thousands of community-based organizations, civic as-
sociations, coalitions, and organizers that regularly mobilize
volunteers to solve problems collectively.8' There are also doz-
ens of organizing schools around the country with the mission
of training volunteers and organizers.
And if one knows how and where to look, most communi-
ties, even the poorest and apparently most disorganized, have a
rich array of formal and informal associations (not counted
among the 1.4 million not-for-profits). One rarely has to start
from scratch. John Kretzman and John McKnight, for instance,
found a wealth of citizen associations in the Grand Boulevard
community of Chicago, a 99% African-American community of
" Hope, supra note 13, at 24.
8,JEREMYRImKN, THm END OF WORK 241 (1995).
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36,000 residents, with a 1989 median income of $8,371.82 The
319 associations they identified included religious, social, cul-
tural, neighborhood improvement, senior, youth, advocacy, and
political groups.3 Many of the leaders of these groups indicated
that they were open to trying something new that would benefit
the community. Most indicated they had never been asked be-
fore .8
There is an enormous volunteer movement out there and
the possibility of its growth in numbers and self-consciousness is
real. There are also millions of Americans dissatisfied with what
one criminal justice scholar has called our "punishment and
imprisonment orgy."85 Those who are unhappy with the way
things are going need to argue for the importance of grassroots
efforts in the decline of violent crime.
Those who want an alternative to the growing emphasis on
punishment, police, and prisons, need to make visible and
honor the volunteers and their millions of acts on behalf of the
public good. They need to focus on the work in high crime and
at-risk neighborhoods, where considerable courage is required
to be an anti-crime volunteer. These are the communities
where organizations have the most acute need for staff, for
training, technical assistance, and education.
Those who want an alternative to "getting tough" should
advocate for an investment in community based organizations
that have the mission of involving people to solve community
problems. It is in these neighborhoods, where the need is
greatest, that resources and visibility can have the largest im-
pact. The possibility of growth in volunteerism is significant.
With adequate investment, some of the predictable disasters of
the "getting tough" strategy may be avoided. With adequate in-
vestment, the present decline in violent crime may be sustained
and thousands of safer, friendlier communities may be created.
82 JOHN P. KRETZMANN & JOHN L. MCKNIGHT, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN Low-
INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS: AN UNEXPLORED COMMUNIY RESOURCE 2 (1996).
"Id. at 4-16.
"Id. at 18.
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